Methodology v0.1 · 2026-08-04
Nothing is a black box
ModelRiskIndex grades production AI models on five things a buyer must answer, rolls them into a tier, and links every grade to evidence. This page is the standard; it has a version number and a changelog because methodology changes are changes too. Disagreements are expected — vendors get a formal rebuttal channel, and rebuttals are published verbatim alongside the contested grade.
The five vectors
Five questions, in the order they decide a deal. Each is graded Strong, Partial, or Weak. Two further states are first-class and distinct from a weak grade: not applicable marks vectors that are properties of the deployer rather than the graded artifact (common for open weights), and under review marks vectors we have not yet assessed or where evidence is in dispute. A grade is a human judgment citing underlying numbers — third-party scores are never averaged across sources, because their methodologies differ.
The framework is deliberately capped at five. Adversarial resistance folds two measures — direct jailbreaks and agentic prompt injection — into one graded slot, shown to the weaker of the two because an attacker takes the easier path; both remain visible as facets on every model page. The test for any proposed sixth vector: does it answer one of these five questions better? If so it is detail that belongs inside one of them. If it is a genuinely new question, only then does the wheel grow.
- Data governance. What happens to your data: training-on-customer-data defaults, retention windows, residency options, and the enterprise-versus-consumer terms gap. A legal property, not a capability — it survives every model generation.
- Operational stability. Whether it changes without warning: versioning discipline, changelog quality, deprecation policy, and observed silent changes. The signal no one else tracks.
- Adversarial resistance. Whether an attacker can make it misbehave — direct jailbreaks against the model's own policies and indirect prompt injection in agentic tool use. Graded to the weaker of the two, because an attacker takes the easier path.
- Transparency. Whether you can see how it was built and tested: model cards, published safety evals, external pre-deployment testing, and disclosure of changes. The mechanism behind the tier ladder.
- Compliance posture. Whether it is certified and compliant: SOC 2, ISO/IEC 42001, HIPAA eligibility, EU AI Act readiness, and audit availability.
Tiers
A model's tier is computed, never assigned: each model answers a fixed requirements checklist, and the tier — along with the exact list of what is missing for the next tier — is derived from those answers. Every checklist answer is visible on the model page. Adding a requirement to this standard forces every tracked model to answer it before the dataset will build; the bar can be raised, but never silently.
- Tier 0. Fails one or more Tier 1 requirements: no published model card or safety evals, or terms that permit training on customer API data by default with no opt-out.
- Tier 1. All of: published model card, published safety evals, documented safety policy, enterprise data controls.
- Tier 2. Tier 1 plus: external pre-deployment testing, third-party certification, versioning with changelogs, stated deprecation policy.
A requirement can be marked not-applicable (with justification) when it cannot meaningfully apply to the artifact — e.g. enterprise data controls for self-hosted open weights. Not-applicable counts as satisfied but is always rendered as N/A, never as a pass.
Composite score
The 0–100 composite is deliberately simple: Strong = 2, Partial = 1, Weak = 0, summed across the applied grades and normalized. Vectors marked not-applicable or under-review are excluded from both numerator and denominator. It exists as a sort key, not a truth claim — the vectors and their evidence are the product.
How our own claims are verified
A site that grades others on transparency has to be checkable itself. Three mechanisms, in increasing order of strength:
- Every claim cites a source. Enforced by schema validation at build time, plus a registry test suite that checks each citation's URL actually belongs to the source it claims.
- Every cited page is archived. A scheduled monitor captures each evidence URL, content-addressed, so a claim stays checkable after the page changes or disappears.
- Claims are bound to a verbatim quote. Where a claim rests on specific wording, we store the exact sentence and verify it appears in the archived page. This converts a live link (weak evidence) into a testable assertion, and means that when a provider edits the sentence a grade rests on, the claim is flagged as invalidated rather than quietly rotting. Live status is public at
/api/v1/verification.
Quote binding is being backfilled across the registry; the verification endpoint publishes the current coverage honestly rather than waiting for it to be complete. An unbound claim is unverified, which is not the same as wrong — the same distinction we apply to the models we grade.
What this cannot do: verify third-party measurements (we can confirm we reported a number correctly and cite its methodology, not that the methodology is sound), or verify a judgment. Grades are human judgments citing evidence; the evidence is verifiable, the judgment is arguable, and keeping those separate is deliberate.
Evidence rules
- No grade ships without at least one evidence reference. This is enforced by schema validation at build time — an unevidenced grade fails the build.
- Every reference carries its source kind, retrieval date, and link. Phase 2 adds content-addressed archived snapshots so claims remain verifiable after source pages change.
- Source trust is tiered: first-party probes (Phase 2) outrank independent evals, which outrank company-level institutional assessments. Company-level sources (e.g. the FLI AI Safety Index) never set model-level grades; they appear as context only.
- Entries marked draft were compiled from known public sources but have not yet been re-verified against a fresh capture of each cited page.
Open-weight models
Open-weight models are graded on a self-hosted reference deployment: data handling and compliance are deployer properties, so they are marked not-applicable rather than graded, while jailbreak and injection resistance are graded on the weights as released, without optional guardrail layers. Hosted first-party endpoints of open-weight models (e.g. DeepSeek's API) are graded as what they are: hosted services with their own terms. The Mistral objection — that deployers control fine-tuning and guardrails — has merit, and this split is our current answer to it.
Conflicts and corrections
When sources disagree materially, the model page shows both with dates and links, and the grade follows documented precedence with the disagreement noted. Corrections ship as visible dataset changes with the error acknowledged — no silent fixes, since the entire premise of this site is that silent changes are bad.
What we are not
Rankings are free and will not be paywalled. No lab pays for placement. Any future commissioned assessment work will be structurally separated from public scores. Revenue comes from monitoring alerts, procurement exports, and data licensing — from buyers, not from the labs being graded.
Methodology changelog
- v0.3 (2026-08-05). Collapsed the framework from six vectors to five: jailbreak and prompt-injection resistance now present as one adversarial resistance vector, graded to the weaker facet, with both measures still shown on each model page. The composite score is now computed over five vectors instead of six. Vector display order was set to buyer priority (data, stability, adversarial, transparency, compliance).
- v0.2 (2026-08-04). Tiers are now computed from a per-requirement checklist instead of assigned; added not-applicable and under-review as first-class grade states; the composite score now excludes unapplied grades from both numerator and denominator. Open-weight deployer-property vectors moved from graded to not-applicable, which changed the composite scores of Llama 4 Maverick, Qwen3, and Kimi K2.
- v0.1 (2026-08-04). Initial publication: six vectors, three tiers, evidence requirements, open-weight reference-deployment convention. All grades are Phase 1 aggregation from public sources; first-party probing is not yet live.